Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism

Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism

Nineveh’s Tribes and Caliphate State… Networks of Mutual Interests and Old Balances, Drawing up Map of Influence, Power and Latent Weaknesses


How ISIS established its state through exploiting tribes’ influence!!

Adel Kamal and Mohammad Ouad

With their index fingers held upright, Sheikhs of tribes appear on a video, advancing in a queue to the forefront of a hall, to meet with the delegation dispatched by self-proclaimed ‘Caliph’, Abi Bakr Al-Baghdadi. They are heard swearing an oath of allegiance and obedience ‘Islamic Bay’ah’, and committing themselves to hoist the banner of the so-called ‘Islamic State’ high.

In such a submissive manner, the organization, which gained power over Nineveh on 10th June, 2014, wanted the photo of 30 Sheiks from the most significant tribes in Nineveh to appear on the

11-minute video released by the organization on the first of April 2015, entitled, “Nineveh’s tribes renew Bay’ah and get prepared for confrontation.”

Some of the Sheikhs appearing on the video seemed rather compelled into coming. Clear signs of confused looks on some faces cannot be beautified by the camera; but on the other hand, other Sheikhs expressed, in the course of their speeches, their pride to have such a long-term cooperation with the ‘Islamic State’.

Those few minutes were nothing but an attempt made by the organization to get tribes implicated with them and cut any confidence bridges, that have already been volatile between most of Nineveh’s tribes’ representatives and the central government in Baghdad.

Such a policy of getting Nineveh’s tribes involved with the State Organization, isn’t in any way new, but its roots extend deep enough to embrace other previous extremist organizations, such as ‘Al-Qaeda’ and ‘Ansar Al-Islam’. Available information and testimonies given by some Sheikhs and individuals, who either vowed allegiance to the organization, or opposed it, and other security members and local officials – reveal the nature of the roles played by some tribesmen within the ISIS ranks in Mosul, its self-declared ‘Caliphate’ Center.

The narratives told show beyond any doubt how the already applied  ‘carrot and stick’ or rather ‘punishment and reward’ policy, has long been formulating the ‘existing contract’ between the two parties for eight long years, until the organization has expanded its power and declared itself a ‘caliphate’, swallowing one third of Iraq’s area.


  Pre-Mosul Occupation ‘Bay’ah’ (Islamic allegiance oath)

“I regained consciousness to find myself lying helplessly close to him on the sidewalk, with my right arm soaked in his warm blood, while security men were watching the scene at a distance, not daring to lift their arms”.  This is the way the brother of Sheikh Barzan Al-Badrani, describes how the latter was shot down in broad daylight on 27/ 7/ 2013, at the hands of unidentified, ghostly-looked militants, who seem to have been also responsible for a score of assassinations during many years in Mosul.

The slaughter of Sheikh Barzan has actually sketched a scenario for the public assassination of one of the most influential dignitaries in Nineveh. Barzan was born in 1978, and became chieftain of ‘Badrani Masters Tribe’ in his 50s. He was known for his opposition to the American occupation of Iraq, and to Baghdad’s government as well.

Barzan was one of the prominent leaders of the demonstrations that were being staged for around ten running months at the square known as ‘Square of Freemen, during which he condemned Baghdad’s policies, particularly as regards its wave of random arrests and sectarian discrimination policies.

That assassination scenario produced several other repeated “bloody” versions, soon after ‘the Levant’  was added to the name ‘Islamic State in Iraq” on 9 /4/ 2013 and hence acronyms like  ‘ISIS’ or ‘ISIL’ started to emerge in mass media.

The number of assassinated Sheikhs in the Governorate of Nineveh alone, since that date, had reached as high as 16 chieftains, on a long list including 24 Sheikhs being liquidated since establishing the “Islamic State” in October 2006.

“In 2012, ‘ISIS’  secretly obtained Al-Bay’ah (oath of allegiance) from some Sheikhs, and those who refused to take their side or keep on maintaining any relations with the central government were hunted down by the organization, and Sheikh Barzan was one of them.”, says Mahmoud Al-Badrani, who had a narrow escape when his brother was assassinated.

When “ISIS” made the mobilizing preparations necessary to take control of Mosul through a sudden attack in June 2013, Sheikh Badran and some other influential Sheikhs refused to communicate with their envoys and that what actually made them postpone their attack for one whole year, during which they planned to get rid of all disloyal Sheikhs one after another,”, he says.

That very same year, ‘ISIS’ launched the largest assassination campaign witnessed by Mosul, which included, besides tribes’ Sheikhs, a long list of journalists, lawyers, doctors, civil servants, tradesmen, army and police personnel and even election candidates. It was “a mass punishment” accompanied with a wave of car bombs, explosive canisters, and booby traps that turned the city into a battlefield and paralyzed most aspects of the daily routine life there.

One victim of this bloody campaign was Sa’ad Zaghlol, Iraqi poet, and Athel Al-Nojaifi, spokesman for Nineveh’s Governor, who was showered with bullets by two militants, while being in his car, on his way to work in the governorate office, on the morning of October 8th, 2013.  Whispers about the involvement of ‘ISIS’ in his death echoed only a few weeks after, when another victim, Watheq Al-Ghadanfri, Athel’s successor at work, was also butchered. Watheq was also a well-known TV presenter, whose programmes were widely viewed.

The traumatic memory of those days cannot escape the memory of Sa’ad Thabit, who was both friend and workmate to both victims. “Mourning pavilions didn’t seem to cease; we were moving daily from one funeral to another, asking ourselves who’ll be next. It was obvious that terrorists were aiming their guns at eminent figures in the city”., he says.


Attack postponed for one whole year

In this way, preparations were made to storm the second thickly-   populated city in Iraq, through getting rid of the most influential personalities in it. They set June 2013 to launch their targeted attack, one whole year prior to the actual seizure of the city.

However, the process of completing ‘ISIS’ target list deferred their scheme for some time, as confirmed on ‘Twitter’, by one of the organization’s renowned members in Mosul, nicknamed as ‘Abu Qattada’. He referred to the repercussions of the security crackdown and the use of excessive force in dispersing the protesters of Hawija sit-ins in April 2013, when the sit-ins’ leaders in Mosul, the majority of whom were Sheikhs and clans’ dignitaries, decided to suspend their sit-ins and declare ‘general mobilization’ against the so-called Islamic State.

Meanwhile, ISIS were preparing to “conquer Mosul” in June 2013, but their fear of clashing with any religious or tribal factions, be it ‘Naqshbandiyyah’ tribe, or the military council of Nineveh’s tribes, who were talking about the breakout of a tribal revolution, are all reasons behind forcing the organization’s leaders to hold on for some time. “We didn’t actually want the credit of any victory we can achieve, be attributed or credited to any of the leaders of those factions and clans”, he says.

Abu Kotada continues saying that Nineveh’s tribes pledged their Bay’ah at least two years before the seizure of Mosul. The Bay’ah they committed themselves to included what he described as “building the caliphate state with souls and monies”, and failing to do so has no meaning but “Reddah or apostasy”, punishable by death and confiscation of belongings. “It took time for the rest of tribes to repent and pledge their allegiance” , he said.


Under-threat Bay’ah

Moustafa Al-Obaidi, a Sheikh from ‘Obaidi tribe’ in Hadar district, 60 km west of Mosul, points out that “ISIS could not have attacked Mosul or seized control over it, before being granted pledge of allegiance from the tribes surrounding the city, or without threatening to punish anyone refusing to do so. Hence, they managed to force  most  Sheikhs into swearing their allegiance oath.”

Sheikh Al-Obaidy, who fled away to Turkey after the downfall of the city, points out that since 2006, Bay’ah has been secretly and individually taking place between ISIS and some of the tribes’ senior dignitaries or Sheikhs, and that continued to happen in an escalating manner up till 2013. “This is because all Mosul’s surroundings are actually inhabited by tribes,” he says.

Waves of successive loyalty pledges ‘Bay’ah’, whether it is voluntary or involuntary, could not in any way be ceased by Iraq’s security forces, in spite of their intensive presence in the city streets and its surrounding towns, since 10/5/ 2008, when ‘Nineveh Operation Command’ was formed under the direct command of head of the government, until the huge collapse eventually took place and clans hastened to declare their stance openly.


Sham and Genuine Sheikhs

Sheikh Reff’at Al-Warrshan, one of ‘Al-Hadideen’ clan’s Sheikhs, briefly comments on the participation of some of his tribe’s members in the video entitled ‘Renewal of Bay’ah’, saying: “The clan in Nineveh is actually a victim, and a few of its sheikhs are willingly involved with ISIS, while the majority of them are forced to yield.” He refused to elaborate, saying, “My cousins are now held ‘prisoners’ by the organization and they will pay dearly for any word I might dare to utter.”

A former journalist, who belongs to one of the eminent tribes and who managed to leave Mosul for Arbil in mid 2015, stressed, on basis of anonymity, on the element of compulsion used by the organization to gain loyalty oaths.

“ It took a whole week to make the necessary arrangements for the video made for the meeting attended by 30 Sheikhs on 23 /3/2015 at Al-Muhandiseen Hall, east of Mosul. Some people who appeared on the video, as the journalist reveals: “are not true Sheikhs, neither are they recognized as Sheikhs by their clans”.

“Sheikh Muhammad Abd Al-Salam, for example, appeared sitting in the third row representing Abbada clan instead of Boraq Al-Ko’ud, the clan’s genuine Sheikh. The same thing is applicable to another bogus man from Al-Hadidien, who claimed to be the clan’s Sheikh as a replacement of Ahmed Al-Warrshan, the genuine Sheikh, who was not present at the meeting.”, the unidentified journalist says.

“Also, the Daouds, chieftains of Bano Al-Hamdan, were not present, neither were the Abdrabos, Nineveh’s chieftains of Al-Jabbour tribe, who were replaced by a tribesman, who was known to be close to Saddam Hussein’s former regime. This is also applicable to Sheikhs of Al-Rashid.”, he says.

The above unnamed journalist also spoke about two types of ‘phony Sheikhs’ manipulated by ISIS for their media propaganda, the first of which is so called ‘banquet Sheikhs’, applicable to those who claim the chieftainship title and exploit it for their own advantage to be present at feasts and political events, besides obtaining posts.

As for the second type, they include genuine Sheikhdoms, such as Saffok Al-Hanash from Ta’i Clan Presidency, and Omar Jumm’a Al-Dwar, Al-Bakkara Sheikh’s son, and other personalities, who represent other tribe branches and appeared in ‘Al Bay’ah’ video clip and spoke openly, but the tribes’ chieftains were absent from the meeting.

According to the journalist, some attendees were actually detained by ‘ISIS’ for their former relations with security forces, but they were released to choose between being dead or repentant. Something that was evidenced when Abu Tabarrak, ISIS’s spokesman, who orchestrated the ‘Bay’ah’ meeting stressed on the issue of Sheikhs’ repentance in the course of his speech, to the extent that he said, addressing his words to one of them seated in a back row ‘“Rest assured Sheikh, door of penitence is wide open” .

That video clip was not in any way the only one, but that very same thing was repeated last May in another ‘Bay’ah’, that had taken place in Badoush, west of Mosul, and attended by seven local tribes’ chiefs residing in that area.

One of the Sheikhs attending that meeting, upon receiving a verbal invitation asking him to attend a crucial meeting from the clans’ office, says, “I was at the meeting place just on time. I saw there some Sheikhs and notables from other clans. The meeting started with a 20-minute speech by their spokesman about the necessity of absolving ourselves from all our clans’ parliamentarians, representatives and officers. Then they circulated some papers among us, which we inserted into our pockets.”

He goes on to say via his fake Facebook account, ” We’ve just gone through the disownment paper handed to us by the Clans Office….One of us has two sons detained by ISIS for their being army officers.”.

MB Abdul Rahman Al-Louzi, who had been disowned by his tribe’s Sheikh in the course of that meeting, said on a phone call,” My clan’s brethren were forced into attending that meeting, being under the threat of either slaughter or detention, like most of the attendees who appeared on the video extract, as I was informed by some of them.”

Tribal sources said that the person who arranged for both the first meeting and second mini one is called Abu Aysha Al-Salami, in his late 30s,was working as a cigarette smuggler, and joined ISIS in 2009 after his brother was killed by the US forces. Then, after the organization had imposed their domination over Mosul, he took charge of the clans’ file. Sources add that Al-Salami was making ceaseless communications with tribal personalities, being in access of the documents available at the Clans Directorate of Nineveh Governorate Offices, and he supervises by himself the arrangement of all details concerned with circulated videos.


Double-faced relation between clans and ISIS

Nineveh is the cradle of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ‘ISIL’ as well as being a safe haven for other militant organizations. It is the second thickly- populated governorate in Iraq, with approximately 3,500,000 people, as per 2009’s statistics. Meanwhile, it is the second largest tribal incubator, after its neighboring Anbar Governorate. There lived several clans and branches of other big clans extending throughout Iraq. They are distributed among different provinces, districts and villages, the majority of whom are Arab Sunnis (more than seventy tribes can be estimated there), particularly in the southern and western areas. Amongst them,  there exist Turkmen tribes on the western side, and Kurdish ones on the northern and eastern sides.

With the sudden ISIS’s control over Nineveh, a double-faced relation emerges in their relation with the tribes, as pointed out by Sheikh Jalal Al-Zebarri, Chief of Nineveh Tribes’ Union, the first of which is pillared on sectarian sinews, and the other, which is described by him as less apparent but most effective, took a purely economic feature.

The organization took advantage of the sectarian aspect to propagate for its ideology, through an army of preachers, the majority of whom are injured fighters or non-Iraqi clerics, in addition to some Imams, who had no choice but to submit. They were distributed  among some 2000 mosques within Mosul and its surroundings, and hastened  to launch their guided propaganda against the ambitions of the Safavid  Government and Beshmerga forces in Iraq’s Kurdistan Province.

Among those influenced by such prejudiced propaganda was Saleh  Hassan, 54 years, now residing with his wife and three kids in Ein Koua, Arbil. He fled away from Al-Quiera, south of Mosul, after being pressurized by a mosque’s Imam to let his eldest son Asa’ad join a training camp, north of the city, where Sadam’s palaces are situated. Recalling how his family remained hidden behind the scenes for twenty long days, he said, “They are brainwashing the youth, saying to them that they are both Sunnis. And if it were not for a relative working with them and facilitated our departure, he might have blown himself somewhere.”

As’aad motives to join ISIS were not only confined to the sectarian common factor between them, or by his  hostility towards the central government, but there was another personal hidden factor lying in having a share in the network of mutual economic interests that extend to include different fields.

And this is what Sheikh Maleeh Az-Zoba’i, a member in Nineveh Governorate Council, discloses by stating that huge and constant revenues strengthened ISIS’s authority, as a result of their close ties with some clans, whereas storming Mosul and its surrounding towns created job opportunities for the benefit of thousands of jobless people.

The organization’s non-combatant members collect monthly salaries starting from  $ 200, an amount sufficient to satisfy the needs of a five-member family, while combatants receive from $300 to 500$ besides their shares from the booties, and that what really motivated many clans to  export fighters to the organization.


Stable clannish incubators

Salem Mohammad Shabk, representative of Shabk clan in Iraqi parliament, points out that some clans are getting involved in the administrative and military structure of ISIS. “Even though more than 15 months have passed since the collapse of the city, there has been no resistance against the occupation of large parts of Nineveh, especially in its thickly -populated southern part.”, he said.

Sheikh Jalal Al-Zibari thinks likewise. He said that since 2003 militant factions have been using the clannish areas, west and south of Nineveh, as their incubators. Then the Islamic State came to do the same very thing since its emergence in 2006 and until now.

Sources from those areas point out that all armed factions, including ISIS focused on recruiting certain people from every clan, and turning them into preachers, military leaders, and leverage tools within the whole clan. The most influential members inside the organization play the same role with their clans, and accordingly the roles supposed to be played by the “genuine Sheikhs” diminish at a snail’s pace.


Incorporation within the state structure

Since ISIS’s self-declaration of Mosul as the center of their ‘Caliphate’ in mid 2014, they have taken advantage of sectarianism, monies, and punishment and in this way they succeeded in incorporating groups form clans’ sons within their newly-established administrative bodies, known as Dwaween.( offices)

Sources from tribes’ and sub-tribes’ chieftains say that ‘ISIS’ distributed the Dwaweens’ assignments among individuals belonging to some particular tribes, with the objective of giving a general impression that they already have well-established clannish alliances.

On the judicial level,  “Judicial Diwan’s’’ posts are occupied in most areas of Nineveh by members from Al-Bou Matuette Clan, whereas Al-Jabbour Clan has more presence in “Grievances Diwan”, which is known to be of a higher authority, being an amalgamation of both legislative and judicial body, equaling ‘prejudice courts’, and is concerned with examining any dispute  that may arise among the tribes themselves. According to sources, “most of the judges in the Grievances Diwan belong to Hamam Al-‘Alil District, south of Mosul”.

Members from Al-Bou Hamad clan have more presence within “Al-Hisbah Diwan”, the body entrusted with implementing the caliphate’s instructions and punishing offenders, (looking much like the so-called “Enjoining Goodness and Forbidding Badness Body),. However, the Turkmen clans take charge of various more crucial executive matters, according to Abd Al-Hamede Al-Fayez, one of Al-Bou Hamad Sheikhs, who is wanted by the organization.

As for the task of collecting taxes from physicians, pharmacists, tradesmen, and other professions, it was assigned  to members from As-Saba’ween clan .

Influential clannish sources from the organization point out that ISIS assigned the responsibility of judicial bodies to members from Iraqi Arab tribes exclusively, contrary to the responsibility of the “Muslim House of Money”, equaling the central bank, which is given to foreigners from different nationalities.


Clannish “Derby”

Intelligence structure of ISIS and the secrecy surrounding its personalities don’t allow doing an accurate statistics for the senior leaders from clannish origins, with the exception of some very limited names, in view of the fact that in most cases, names of senior leaders are only revealed after they are either killed or detained.

A survey of the organization data shows that Al-Jabbour and Al-Bou Hamdan clans compete on taking the leading posts within the organization structure of the “Islamic State” in Nineveh, especially administrative and military posts. It is the same rivalry that had been taking place since 2005 between the two clans over the government’s security and administrative positions. The post of police chief commander of Nineveh was occupied alternately by the two clans and has never gone out of their hands. They were also used to occupy the presidency of Nineveh Council alternately.

Such “clannish derby” between those two clans is not something new, but it goes back deep in history long before the emergence of ISIS, since the members of the two clans have long been used to have their presence within the security and administrative bodies, whether locally in Nineveh or at large in the Iraqi State.


Awaiting a strong party

The presence of a clannish structure for ISIS means that their organization tried to interact with the already existing clannish organization structure in the city to maintain the stability of their rule. That was actually the very same strategy adopted  by all the governments formed either before or after 2003. The difference was always in polarizing some parties from the same clannish formation but not changing the clannish balance in favor of one clan at the expense of the other. Hence, ISIS followed that very same strategy through polarizing sheiks from within the same clannish balance.

A Sheikh from Al-Jabbour clan in Hamam Al-‘alil district briefs the whole status quo in Nineveh by saying: “Clans here are involved everywhere within ISIS’s organization, starting from ‘Al-Hisbah’ and jurisdiction authorities, and ending in sharing in the trade of confiscated real estates and the oil produced or smuggled through a wide network of roads. As for the clan’s chieftain, he’s regarded  by the government either as a terrorist, or as a refugee fleeing away from Nineveh, or as a victim killed at the hands of ISIS.”

That very same Sheikh confirms that dignitaries from all clans are now constituting “the pillar of the newly-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate State, through seizing the actual authority in the city, but on the other hand, weakening  the old prestige of the genuine clans’ Sheikhs, that has actually become nothing but symbolic.”, he said.

That very same symbolism is what urged the organization  to show the thirty Sheikhs on their video clip entitled “Renewal of Al-Bay’ah”. Commenting on that clip, Sheikh said,“ That was a crystal clear audio video message conveyed to both Baghdad and the outside world, saying that the uprisings experiment of 2006 would not be repeated again, and any military movement would  not only be targeting ISIS, but all the clans of Nineveh.

However, the hoped-for aim behind the video message conveyed by ‘Caliph’ Abi Bakr Al-Baghdadi does not necessarily seem effective, in the light of some information about signs of nagging complaints within the clans’ ranks..

Sheikh Jalal Al-Zeebari, head of Nineveh Clans’ Union, reveals that he exchanges messages with two of the important clans’ Sheikhs, who were seen on the first video tape, in which they express their intention to defect and leave Mosul once they have any chance to do so, and seek help in this regard.

Meanwhile, Sheikh Mahmoud As-Sourgy, spokesman for Nineveh’s  National Gathering, including clannish forces based on a camp stationing across the borders of Kurdistan Province, nearby Mosul- he said that more than five people seen on the video had called him stating that they were forced to do so, and expressing their readiness to encourage their followers to join the camp, conditional on not revealing their names..

Entisar Aj-Jabouri, Iraqi MB representing Nineveh Governorate, admits that the clans handed the city’s keys to the terrorist groups, but she thinks that a huge shift had taken place after the brutality perpetrated by the organization.

Al-Jabouri believes that most of the clans’ sons “had now come back to their senses”, and are now quite ready, if supported by the government, to revolt against ISIS and expel them forever”.

“Every clan has its own endless vengeance with ISIS, especially after the latter had executed during August 2015 alone more than 3,000 people, most of them are renowned personalities who represent all the clans of Nineveh including: former local and central Iraqi election candidates, journalists, media men, lawyers, doctors, and Iraqi Army personnel.” she says.

Likewise, Sheikh Mahmoud Al-Sourgy, points out that unless Iraq’s government or the International Alliance provide the Popular Gathering known as ‘Al-Hashd’ with arms and ammunitions, the situation will remain as it is. He draws attention that 4920 fighters had already been graduated from the camp, most of whom are from the two tribes of Al- Jabour and Shamr. He revealed that he had received 25,000  new applications to join the training camp from the clans’ folk, ‘but we have not responded to them, due to a shortage of weaponry and other training requirements’. He also says that clans are ready to fight, but the International alliance and Iraq’s Government let them down.”

A senior security officer in Nineveh city is of the opinion that any plan to get rid of ISIS, excluding clans, will be doomed to failure, especially south and east of the city. He warns that the liberation project should not be solely reliant on the tribes, due to the intelligence nature of the organization which would prevent them from any movement in the first place.

That security official lays stress on the necessity of the first strike to be carried out by ‘another strong party’, and to be supported by the clans who ought to play a ‘supportive, complimentary role.’

*A list of the major clans’ chieftains, who had fallen victims since the establishment of “the Islamic State” in 2006 to August 2015, includes:

Sheikh Edris Shehatha Nasser , chief of a clan branch in Al-Bou Hamad;

Sheikh Saleh Elias Yaseen, chief of Al-‘Akeidat clan;

Sheikh Falah Al-Frhat, chief of Al-Frhat clan;

Sheikh Ali  Al Jaban, chief of Al Jaban clan;

Sheikh Shahatha Aj-Jaza’a, chief of Al-Bou Matuette clan;

Sheikh Rashid Al-Zedan one of Al-Lahib clan Sheikhs;

Sheikh Abd Al-Bari Al-Lahib, one of Al-Lahib clan Sheikhs;

Sheikh Abd Al-Karem Al-Luheibi, one of Al-Lahib clan Sheikhs and the head of Nineveh Clans Assembly;

Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Marir, one of Al-Lahib clan Sheikhs;

Sheikh Fouzi Muhsen Obou Al-Hiali, chief of Al-Hialeen clan,;

Sheikh Mahmoud As-Sab’oui, head of As-Saba’oween clan;

Sheikh Abd Al-Aziz At-Tabour, one of Al- Jabour clans’ Sheikhs; Sheikh Ahmed Ar-Rammah, head of Ar-Rammah clan;

Sheikh Muhammad Obeid Al-Hamadani head of Al-bou Hamad clan; Sheikh Brazan Hazem Al-Bdrani, head of Al-Bou Bdran clan;

Sheikh Saeed Abbas Al-Jabbouri, one of Aj-Jabour clans’ Sheikhs; Sheikh Muhammad Taher Al-Abd Rabou, the general Sheikh of Al-Jabour clan;

Sheikh Khaled Az-Zobeidy, one of Az-Zobeid clan’s Sheikhs;

Sheikh Sabhaan Al-Kassab, head of Anza clan;

Sheikh Salem Yossef Al-Keky ; head of Al-Kekia clan;

Sheikh Ahmed Naïf Al-Marir head of Al-Marir clan;

Sheikh Muhammad Khaled Ash-Sharrabi, head of Ash-Sharrabeen clan; Sheikh Rayan Al-Abd Rabou Al-Jabbouri, one of Al- Jabour clans’ Sheikhs; Sheikh Ra’ed Al-‘eliani one of Al- Jhaish clan’s Sheikhs.


*Names of the thirty clans whose members attended the Bay’ah meeting on 1/4/2015 and declared their allegiance to the self-proclaimed Caliphate,  claiming to represent their clans.

Al-Bou Bdran clan, Al- Bou Hamdan clan, Ta’i clan, An-Na’em clan, Al-Abbada clan, Al-Akeidat clan, Al-Jabour clan, Al-Lahib clan, Ad-Dalim clan, Bani Rabei’h clan, Al-Hamdoun clan, Al-Bakkara clan, Al- Jhaish clan, As-Saba’oween clan, Ash-Sharifat, Bani Eit clan, Al-Bou Salama, Al-Jerjaria clan, Ar-Rashed clan, Al-Loaizein clan, Al-Hialein clan, Al-Bou Matuette clan, As-Soumeda’h clan, Al-Bou Hian clan, Al-Kaffaja clan, Aj-Jwala clan, Aj-Janabein clan, Al-Ma’amera clan, Al-Bou ‘Ojeil clan,  and Az-Zoubeid clan.


* This report was done with the support of Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism (NIRIJ), and under the supervision of KumayAl-Mulhim.

September 2015